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Brown II: A Case of Missed Opportunity?
Trina Jones*
When contemplating "desegregation's children," one
automatically thinks of the failed attempt to desegregate U.S.
schools and the effects of that failure on the life opportunities of
many of this nation's young. These children are the direct
descendants of the historic Brown v. Board of Education cases.
The Brown legacy, however, extends beyond these obvious and
acknowledged heirs and beyond the context of education. For
what one sees in Brown 1P and Brown II,2 these great
constitutional landmarks, is a trend that is too often reflected in
U.S. jurisprudence and U.S. society; that is, an embrace of lofty
principles coupled with a simultaneous inability or unwillingness
to undertake the messy work of devising and implementing
effective solutions. This Essay examines this aspect of the Brown
opinions, not in an effort to malign their significance or their
import, but in an attempt to demonstrate the difficulty of fixing
America's race problem. Because Brown II cannot be understood
without reference to Brown I, and because neither can be fairly
examined separately from the historical context in which each was
delivered, I begin with an overview of the social context in which
the decisions were rendered. I then turn to some of the
implications, specifically of Brown II, for the legal struggles that
followed and that continue today.
I. Situating Brown
The nation into which the Brown decisions were delivered
was dramatically different, in some cases unimaginably different,
from the one in which we find ourselves today. By the mid-1950s,
the Reconstruction Era-that brief period immediately following
slavery when the states ratified the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments,3 when Congress passed federal statutes
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank my
research assistants, Yendelela Neely and Camille Cooper, for their excellent work
on this essay.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV
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like the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1870,4 when two African
Americans were elected to the United States Senate, twenty to the
House of Representatives and numerous others to state and local
public office,' when Black literacy and land ownership rates
dramatically increased-that brief period of time when African
Americans were able to improve their lots despite severe adversity
was nothing but a distant memory. The U.S. Supreme Court was
in part responsible for Reconstruction's end. In the latter part of
the nineteenth century, the Court systematically undermined the
Reconstruction Amendments in a series of cases, the crowning
jewel being Plessy v. Ferguson.7 In that 1896 decision, the Court
determined that a Louisiana statute requiring separate, but
supposedly equal, railway cars for Whites and Blacks was
constitutional.8 In Plessy's wake, the states passed hundreds of
statutes requiring segregation in almost every area of life,
including restaurants, theatres, buses, hotels, swimming pools,
voting booths, residences, the workplace, marital relations, water
fountains, and schools.! Segregation even extended to death, for
hearses could not carry both Black and White bodies and
cemeteries were required to have separate graveyards-one for
Blacks, another for Whites."o In 1949, only fifteen states had no
segregation laws in effect." Jim Crow racism was entrenched.
[hereinafter Reconstruction Amendments].
4. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Civil Rights
Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
5. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY To
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 241-42 (7th ed. 1994).
6. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 46-47 (5th ed. 2004).
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S.
483 (1954); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)
(interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee the privileges and
immunities of citizenship only as determined by the federal government and not by
the states); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (using the concept of "state action"
to invalidate sections of congressional statute that prohibited private individuals
from denying Blacks equal access to places of public accommodations and
amusement).
8. 163 U.S. at 552, overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
9. See Susan Falk, Jim Crow Legislation Overview,
http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/resources/lessonplans/hs-esjimcrow-laws.htm
(last visited Sept. 11, 2005); FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 5, at 262; RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 86 (Vintage Books 2004) (1975).
10. Falk, supra note 9; For an overview of segregation laws, see generally
Ronald L.F. Dasu's Creating Jim Crow: In-Depth Essay,
http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/history/creating2.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2005);
see also FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 5, at 262; BELL, supra note 6, at 215-16.
11. See Falk, supra note 9.
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The law, however, was neither the only nor the primary
mechanism used to enforce white supremacy in the decades
leading up to Brown. Terror and intimidation were a pervasive
and constant threat: Hate groups like the Klu Klux Klan
flourished, 12 and lynchings, where African Americans were
murdered often in carnival-like atmospheres, were prevalent. 3
Indeed, between 1880 and 1930, an estimated 3,200 African
Americans were lynched in the South alone. 4 Race riots were
instigated in places like Chicago, Illinois; Wilmington, North
Carolina; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Sherman, Texas."' And so called
"nigger drives," those organized efforts to remove African
Americans from their towns in order to claim their land, were
orchestrated.
16
In the middle of the twentieth century, the United States was
a nation dripping with racial hatred. Yet, it was in this social
context and against this evil that brave individuals like Charles
Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and the other heroic
lawyers of the NAACP chose to act. After decades of litigation and
strategizing," this cadre of lawyers brought the five cases involved
in the Brown decisions. 8
The Brown litigation was an aggressive move by the NAACP.
12. See FRANKLIN & Moss, supra note 5, at 249-50.
13. See id. at 312-14; see also WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY
IN AMERICA (James Allen ed., 2000) (documenting public celebration of lynchings);
RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS (2nd prtg. 1998) (same); W. FITZHUGH
BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930
(1993) (same).
14. BRUNDAGE, supra note 13, at 8.
15. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 99-100, 108-09
(2004); see also FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 5, at 313-17.
16. OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 99. For additional reading on the backlash
against African Americans during and following Reconstruction, see FRANKLIN &
MOSS, supra note 5, at 247-63 and OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 97-110.
17. See OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 111-23 (describing on the NAACP's legal
efforts leading up to Brown). See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (1994); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
18. Four of these cases (Brown v. Board of Education, Briggs v. Elliott, Davis v.
County School Board, and Gebhart v. Belton) were consolidated in Brown I. Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1954); OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 4-6. The
fifth case, Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided the same day as
Brown I, but under the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 500.
The Court had to decide Bolling on different grounds because the District of
Columbia (the governmental actor involved in this case) is not a state. Thus, the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, under which the other four
cases were decided, does not apply to it. Id. at 498-99.
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The litigation forced the Court to address directly the
constitutionality of Plessy's separate but equal doctrine."5 The
question was squarely put: "Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the
children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities?"" In Brown I, the Justices unequivocally stated
"[wie believe that it does." 1
Importantly, this outcome was not preordained. The Brown
cases were argued twice. 2 After oral argument in the 1952-53
term, the Court was reportedly split on the outcome, and the cases
were reargued in the 1953-54 term." A key development occurred
shortly before the second argument-the death of Chief Justice
Vinson, an avid supporter of Plessy's separate but equal doctrine. 4
With Chief Justice Vinson's demise, an event that reportedly
caused Justice Frankfurter to say "[t]his is the first indication I
have had that there is a God," California Governor Earl Warren
became Chief Justice and the Warren era began."
The Brown opinions are remarkably short. 6 They are also
unanimous, which several Justices believed to be important given
the seriousness of the issue before the Court and given the specter
of Southern non-compliance." In Brown I, decided on May 17,
1954, the Court stressed the importance of education in our
democratic society.5 In addition, the Court noted that a good
education did not turn merely on whether schools were equal in
terms of physical facilities and resources." The Court emphasized
the importance of "those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement,""° in other words "intangible considerations," like a
19. See OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 8 (noting that until Brown, the NAACP's
litigation strategy had focused on equalization and had attempted to show that
separate facilities generally were not equal). The issue of Plessy's legitimacy was
raised in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), but the Court reserved decision on
the issue. Id. at 636.
20. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 488.
23. OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 8-9.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I/), 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
27. OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 8-9.
28. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
29. Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
30. Id. at 493.
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student's "ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange
views with other students."3' Ultimately, the Court found that
"[t]o separate [elementary and high school students] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."32 It concluded that "in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."3
This strike at the heart of the separate but equal doctrine
gave the NAACP lawyers and others vested in the fight for racial
equality a huge victory. But the Court made a grave error: it
punted when it came to the question of a remedy. The Court
stated that because the cases consolidated before it were class
actions, and due to the "wide applicability" of its decision and the
"great variety of local conditions," a remedy would be difficult to
formulate.34 Therefore, the Court restored the cases to its docket
and scheduled additional arguments on the question of relief,
inviting the parties and all of the attorneys general of the states
requiring or permitting segregated educational facilities to
appear.3 5 The Court faced two issues on the question of relief: (1)
whether the desegregation process should be managed by the
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts; and (2) whether to
desegregate fast by requiring the immediate desegregation of
public schools or slowly with a gradual move toward
desegregation.36
If Brown I was a cause for celebration, then Brown H,
delivered on May 31, 1955, 7 was cause for despair. In this brief
opinion, the Court placed oversight of the desegregation process in
the hands of the district courts,38 which in some cases had been the
31. Id. (quoting McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950)).
32. Id. at 494.
33. Id. at 495.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 495-96. There are certainly plausible reasons for the Court to punt on
the relief issue. By leaving the question of an appropriate remedy to another day,
the Court was able to secure unanimous agreement on the key constitutional
principle. Id. at 493. In addition, the Court may have been legitimately perplexed
about an appropriate remedy and desirous of additional guidance and reflection on
the matter. These reasons would explain the Court's delay in addressing the relief
question. They would not, however, excuse the abdication of responsibility and
compromise of principle embodied in Brown H.
36. Id. at 495 n.13.
37. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
38. Id. at 299.
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very entities to support segregation. 9 The Court reasoned that:
Full implementation of [Brown I] may require solution of
varied local school problems .... [Clourts will have to consider
whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith
implementation of the governing constitutional principles.
Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible
need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard
these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal."
The Court urged that traditional equitable principles be
applied to resolve difficulties in implementation, balancing the
"personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as
soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis" with the public
interest in a "systematic and effective" transfer.4'
The answer to the second relief issue, the question of timing,
was less clear. The Court stated that "it should go without saying
that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be
allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them" and
indicated its expectation that the defendants would "make a
prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with [Brown
].,42 It went on to note, however, that additional time might be
needed to carry out the ruling and mentioned the administrative
difficulties that might arise during the transition. 3 The Court
ultimately remanded the cases to the district courts with orders to
"take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees
consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit
to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all
14deliberate speed the parties to these cases.
From the above, it was clear that the Court had rejected the
plaintiffs' requests for immediate relief and that it had declined to
set a definite time frame for formulating desegregation plans or an
end point when segregated schools must cease to exist. But,
beyond this, the nation was left to wonder what the Court's use of
"all deliberate speed" meant. Thurgood Marshall, the chief
architect of the Brown litigation, concluded that the phrase was
39. Note, for example, that Brown I changed the lower courts' decisions in
Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F. Supp. 920 (D.S.C. 1952), Davis v. County School Board, 103
F. Supp. 337 (D. Va. 1952), Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1951), and Bolling v. Sharpe. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharp,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
40. Brown I, 349 U.S. at 299.
41. Id. at 300.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 300-01.
44. Id. at 301.
[Vol. 24:9
A CASE OF MISSED OPPORTUNITY
synonymous with S-L-O-W.45 And, Marshall was right. It took at
least a decade before any meaningful desegregation of public
education occurred, and that progress was quickly dismantled.46
Scholars may debate the true impact of Brown I and Brown II
and whether it was the opinions or other social forces already in
play which led to the unraveling of the social, political, and legal
order built upon Jim Crow racism. Regardless of where one comes
out on the causal issue, one thing is clear: the Justices in the
Brown opinions acted in a tumultuous time on a tumultuous issue,
and their rulings fundamentally altered the status of Blacks. As
Robert Carter, one of the lead lawyers involved in the cases, has
noted, "Blacks were no longer supplicants, seeking, pleading,
begging to be treated as full-fledged members of the human
race .... [After Brown, tihey were entitled to equal treatment as a
right under the law."47 For this reason, the Brown opinions are a
truly remarkable achievement.
II. Brown II and Decades of Judicial Conservatism
While the Justices are to be commended for their courage in
Brown I, there are many reasons to be critical of Brown 11, several
of which are chronicled in this symposium and elsewhere. This
Part focuses on two issues that were present in Brown If and that
have recurred in the Supreme Court's race jurisprudence since
that time. First is the apparent absence of any real sense of
urgency in remedying a diagnosed wrong, especially when the
remedy might upset the expectations of Whites. Indeed, one could
45. OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 10 (noting that "[w]hen asked to explain his
view of 'all deliberate speed,' Thurgood Marshall frequently told anyone who would
listen that the term meant S-L-O-W").
46. See GARY ORFIELD, SUSAN E. EATON & THE HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996) (chronicling desegregation efforts in the aftermath
of Brown). For information on the modern trend toward resegregation in public
schools, see ERIKA FRANKENBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2002), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/researcb/deseg/resegRaceinAmerican_
PublicSchools.pdf.
47. Robert Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237
(1968). Carter goes on to note:
Brown's indirect consequences, therefore, have been awesome. It has
completely altered the style, the spirit, and the stance of race relations.
Yet the pre-existing pattern of white superiority and black subordination
remains unchanged .... Few in the country, black or white, understood in
1954 that racial segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; that
the real sickness is that our society in all of its manifestations is geared to




argue that Brown 11 was an unjustifiable compromise of the
constitutional rights of African Americans. As Professor Derrick
Bell notes, the Warren Court sacrificed the "right of blacks to a
desegregated education in favor of a remedy more palatable to
whites."8 To be sure, in its defense, the Court knew it was dealing
with an explosive situation and that it had no real support from
the President or from Congress. 4' Had the Court issued a stronger
remedial order, enforcement could have sparked a constitutional
crisis the outcome of which would have been unpredictable.
Caution, therefore, was arguably not unreasonable.
But what message did the Court send to the African
American community by embracing gradualism and deferring to
the concerns of Whites? Usually, when the Court finds a
constitutional violation, it requires an immediate solution." When
it did not take this course in Brown 11, did the Court tacitly (and
perhaps unconsciously) suggest that the rights of African
Americans were less important than the rights of others? Was
state-supported racism a less pernicious evil than other
constitutional violations? In addition, what message did the Court
inadvertently send to those looking to thwart the decision? Could
it be, as Professor Bell notes, the Court:
[F]ailed to recognize the depth or nature of the problem, and
by attempting to regulate the pace of desegregation so as to
convey a show of compassion and understanding of the
problem facing the White South, it not only failed to develop a
willingness to comply, but instead aroused the hope that
resistance to the constitutional imperative would succeed."
In short, did the embrace of gradualism embolden efforts against
desegregation and contribute to the decades of stalling tactics that
effectively undermined real change?
That is the first issue under examination. The second issue
arises from the Court's unwillingness to engage the true
complexity of the problem before it. In Brown I, the Court
48. BELL, supra note 6, at 147 (2004) (characterizing the views of Robert L.
Carter, one of the lead NAACP lawyers in Brown).
49. The Court has no enforcement power and support from the executive and
legislative branches was weak. President Eisenhower did not want to support
desegregation lest it, among other things, diminish his high approval ratings with
southern voters. OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 125-26. Opposition in Congress was
also considerable. Indeed, ninety percent of southern congressmen signed a
"Southern Manifesto" in which they claimed that Brown was a "clear abuse of
judicial power" and voted to reverse it. Id. at 126.
50. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. BELL, supra note 6, at 147 (summarizing the views of Robert L. Carter); see
also OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 10 (asserting that Brown II "legitimized much of
the social upheaval" that followed the Brown I decision).
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discussed the evil of laws mandating segregated schools and
alluded to a healthily integrated society-a society where students
of all races could interact freely and could learn and grow from
each other with mutual respect and appreciation." Yet, in Brown
II, the Court set forth a solution that was limited to desegregation;
that is, the elimination of laws requiring separate educational
facilities for different races." Certainly, desegregation was an
important first step. However, the elimination of de jure
segregation does not automatically lead to integration. If the
conditions and mindsets which gave rise to de jure segregation
remain, then while the law may change, the underlying
circumstances may not. And, in the decades following Brown,
school districts came up with myriad ways to achieve a segregated
result without necessarily resorting to legal prohibitions against
racially integrated schools.54 To forestall these sorts of efforts, a
stronger indictment of state-sponsored racism was needed. Yet, it
was this very indictment that the Court did not give in Brown 11.
As I stated earlier, these two themes have surfaced in
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The Court's treatment of
affirmative action provides an excellent case study for this point.
Despite the existence of stark indicators of continuing racial
inequality,55 a significant number of Justices have expressed deep
skepticism about affirmative action. This skepticism is driven in
52. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
53. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 360 (1955).
54. For examples of southern resistance, see OGLETREE, supra note 15, at 127-
31.
55. Poverty rates for Blacks and Hispanics typically exceed the national
average. In 2001, 22.7% of Blacks and 21,4% of Hispanics were poor, compared to
11.7% of the total population. By comparison, 9.9% of Whites and 10.2% of Asians
and Pacific Islanders lived in poverty in 2001. See BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR &
JOSEPH DALAKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 6 fig.3 (Sept. 2001),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-219.pdf. The unemployment rate for
African Americans is generally twice that of Whites. See, e.g., Employment
Situation Summary: December 2004, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 7, 2005),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_01072005.pdf (listing
unemployment figures for Blacks and Whites). And, considerable gaps in education
and incarceration rates, among other things, persist. See Page M. Harrison &
Jennifer C. Karberg, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2002, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT. BULL., April 2003 (noting that "[a]mong males age twenty-five to twenty-
nine, 12.9% of blacks were in prison or jail, compared to 4.3% of Hispanics, and
about 1.6% of whites"); The Persisting Racial Gap in College Student Graduation
Rates, J. BLACKS HIGHER ED., Autumn 2004, at 77, 77 (reporting that the college
graduation rate for Black students is twenty-one percentage points lower than the
rate for White students); Karen MacPherson, Minority High School Graduation
Rate Just 50%, (Feb. 26, 2004), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04057/277625.stm
(noting that nationwide the high school graduation rate for minority students is
about 50%, while that for White students is approximately 75%).
2006]
Law and Inequality [Vol. 24:9
part by the fact that the Court has focused on the concerns of those
who are left out by affirmative action rather than the plight of
those let in by the programs.
For example, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke," the Court's first major affirmative action case, five
Justices rejected arguments in support of a special admissions
program for minority students in part because of the program's
impact on Whites.57 Four Justices concluded that Title VI's
prohibition against the use of race in programs receiving federal
funds extended to Whites as well as to people of color."5 Thus, to
the extent the medical school's affirmative action program
excluded Whites, it was unlawful-even if the program's goals
were to ensure the inclusion of historically excluded groups and to
correct the under-representation of minorities in the medical
profession. 9 Although Justice Powell, the fifth Justice, concluded
that race can be used to promote diversity in higher education, he
also found the program unlawful. In Powell's view, Whites did not
receive a fair opportunity to compete because (1) sixteen of the one
hundred available seats were reserved for minority applicants;
and (2) applicants in the special admissions program were not
compared with those in the regular admissions program. °
Seventeen years later, in Adarand v. Pena, another landmark
affirmative action case, the Court continued to express concern
about the effects of racial classifications on Whites.6' In Adarand,
56. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Alan Bakke, a White male, sued the U.C. Davis
Medical School for race discrimination alleging that the Medical School's special
admissions program violated his equal protection rights. Id. That admissions
program was designed to increase the school's number of disadvantaged minority
students. Id. at 272. Notably, under the special admissions program, minority
candidates were evaluated separately from regular candidates for admission, and
sixteen out of one hundred seats in the entering class were set aside for individuals
within the designated groups. Id. at 275. Bakke was upset because he had been
rejected while minority students with lower test scores had been admitted. Id. at
276-77. Among other things, the Medical School responded by arguing that its
admissions program was necessary to counter the effects of societal discrimination
and to obtain the educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse student
body. Id. at 306.
57. Id. at 265.
58. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). These justices believed that Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 resolved the issue and saw no need to reach the constitutional question.
Id. at 408-11. Title VI states that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
59. Bakke, 473 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
60. 438 U.S. at 275, 319-20.
61. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Certain Justices have focused on the deleterious
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the Court held that "any person, of whatever race, has the right to
demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify any racial classifications subjecting that person to unequal
treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny."62 The ruling
meant that any racial classification, regardless of the motive
behind the classification, would be subject to the same rigorous
review standard.63  The consequences of this holding are twofold:
effects of affirmative action on people of color, usually by pointing to the stigma
associated with affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (asserting
that "[tihe majority of blacks are admitted to the Law School because of
discrimination, and because of this policy all are tarred as undeserving); see also
Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). This argument, however, appears to be at most of secondary
importance in the Court's rulings and is readily countered by the fact that the
immediate beneficiaries of the programs at issue do not raise this concern. Perhaps
the beneficiaries recognize that a greater danger of reinforcing stigma and negative
stereotypes lies in the discriminatory exclusion of people of color than in their
inclusion. As Justice Stevens points out in Adarand:
[t]he exclusionary decision rests on the false premise that differences in
race, or in the color of a person's skin, reflect real differences that are
relevant to a person's right to share in the blessings of a free society....
The inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process inevitably
tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion could only tend to
foster it.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Interestingly, while some
Justices comment in passing on the effects of affirmative action on African
American self-perception, their concerns about stigma often seem more focused on
the way in which Whites view African Americans than the way in which African
Americans view themselves. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This again suggests that some
members of the Court are more fixated on the response of Whites to affirmative
action programs than on the underlying inequality these programs seek to address.
62. 515 U.S. at 224. In Adarand, the Court extended the holding of City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), to federally created affirmative
action measures. Croson involved a city ordinance requiring that 30% of the city's
contracting work go to minority-owned businesses. Id. at 477-78. In invalidating
the ordinance on constitutional grounds, a majority of the Court held that the same
standard of review applied to all racial classifications regardless of the 'race of
those burdened or benefitted." Id. at 494. That standard, the Court determined,
was strict scrutiny. Id. at 492-94. This was a death knell because at that time, the
Court had never upheld an affirmative action program under strict scrutiny.
Indeed, this had led many commentators to conclude that strict scrutiny was "strict
in theory, but fatal in fact." 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980). In addition, the Court held that to
justify a remedial affirmative action measure, the entity in question must have
engaged in the discrimination to be remedied and the discrimination must be
specifically identified. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506.
63. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226. The Court stated that strict scrutiny is required
because:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are
"benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed,
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first, it makes affirmative action programs incredibly difficult to
defend; and second, it elevates reverse discrimination claims to the
same level as cases alleging discrimination because of racism (i.e.,
cases in which the actor seeks to subordinate the excluded group).
In its most recent statement on affirmative action, Grutter v.
Bollinger64 and Gratz v. Bollinger6 (the Michigan cases), the Court
reiterated its commitment to applying strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications." In the two cases, the Court was asked to
determine whether the consideration of race in the admissions
policies of the University of Michigan Law School 7 and the
undergraduate College of Literature, Science, and Arts6 was
lawful. Although the Court upheld the law school's admissions
policy in Grutter because that policy considered race as one
variable among many and because minority applicants were not
shielded from competition with White applicants, 69  the
undergraduate admissions policy at issue in Gratz failed. 0 The
Court determined that the automatic allocation of twenty points to
undergraduate minority applicants unfairly advantaged minorities
to the detriment of Whites.7' Importantly, although the Court in
Grutter and Gratz expanded the acceptable justifications for
affirmative action by holding that diversity is a compelling state
interest,2 review of the opinions suggests that the Court may have
been influenced by the fact that diversity in higher education
benefits everyone-Whites as well as people of color. 3  Thus,
unlike in remedial contexts where many Whites believe they bear
the brunt of affirmative action programs because they are denied
the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.
Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.)). Oddly
enough, this tightening of the standard came in cases where there was not even a
suggestion that the programs at issue were anything but benign regarding people
of color. See id. at 206-07. This again raises the question of what really motivated
the change-the impact on people of color, or the impact on Whites?
64. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
65. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
66. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27.
67. Id. at 311.
68. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251-52.
69. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35.
70. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269, 275.
71. Id. at 271-75.
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268. The University did not
rely upon remedial justifications for its policies, but rather argued that the policies
were necessary to promote diversity. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315-16.
73. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319-20.
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positions filled by people of color with no apparent countervailing
benefit to Whites as a group, 4 in the context of diversity, while
some White applicants might be denied admission, the perception
is that White students as a group (indeed all students) benefit by
having students of color admitted. Thus, with diversity, the
seeming advantage, or "special" privilege, is not viewed as all in
favor of one race to the detriment of another.
What these cases, among others, demonstrate is that instead
of being proactive and responding aggressively to racism and its
continuing effects on people of color, the Supreme Court has been
consumed with the effects of affirmative action on Whites. I am
not saying that this concern is irrelevant or that caution is not
warranted. Rather, I am suggesting that this concern should not
automatically assume primacy, but instead should become part of
a forthright discussion of the history of racism in this country and
its continuing effects. Such a discussion would illuminate rather
than brush aside the wrong of racism. It would examine the
problem of inherited advantage and inherited disadvantage. It
would explain that there are no true innocents and why we must
all participate in (and how we will all benefit from) the end of
racial subordination." It would engage the issues that are so
effectively set forth in Lester Thurow's use of the race metaphor in
The Zero-Sum Society." Briefly, Thurow asks us to:
Imagine a race with two groups of runners of equal ability.
Individuals differ in their running ability, but the average
speed of the two groups is identical. Imagine that a
handicapper gives each individual in one of the groups a heavy
weight to carry. Some of those with weights would still run
faster than some of those without weights, but on average, the
handicapped group would fall farther and farther behind the
group without the handicap.
Now suppose that someone waves a magic wand and all
of the weights vanish. Equal opportunity has been created. If
74. But see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic
Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (2002)
(explaining that the exclusionary effect of race-conscious admission policies on
Whites is quite small).
75. Opponents of affirmative action measures often point out that legalized
segregation against African Americans ended decades ago and that slavery was
abolished well over a century ago. Asserting that they did not discriminate against
or enslave anyone, these opponents ask why they should pay for these acts. The
argument, in short, is "If there was a wrong, I didn't do it and therefore I shouldn't
bear the costs of addressing it." I call this the "Not My Fault" or "I Didn't Do
Anything Wrong" syndrome. The difficulty with this reasoning is that it is
ahistorical. It views the present with no consideration for how the past has shaped
who we are and where we are today.
76. LESTER C. THuRow, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 188-89 (1980).
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the two groups are equal in their running ability, the gap
between those who never carried weights and those who used
to carry weights will cease to expand, but those who suffered
the earlier discrimination will never catch up. If the economic
baton can be handed on from generation to generation, the
current effects of past discrimination can linger forever.77
To be sure, the hard question is figuring out how to bridge
the gap between the runners. Again, Thurow is helpful. He notes:
If a fair race is one where everyone has an equal chance
to win, the race is not fair even though it is now run with fair
rules. To have a fair race, it is necessary to (1) stop the race
and start over, (2) force those who did not have to carry
weights to carry them until the race has equalized, or (3)
provide extra aid to those who were handicapped in the past
until they catch up.
While these are the only three choices, none of them is a
consensus choice in a democracy. Stopping the race and
starting over would involve a wholesale redistribution of
physical and human wealth. This only happens in real
revolutions, if ever. This leaves us with the choice of
handicapping those who benefitted from the previous
handicaps or giving special privileges to those who were
previously handicapped. Discrimination against someone
unfortunately always means discrimination in favor of
someone else. The person gaining from discrimination may
not be the discriminator, but she or he will have to pay part of
the price of eliminating discrimination. This is true regardless
of which technique is chosen to eliminate the current effects of
past discrimination."8
Instead of directly engaging these complex issues, carefully
balancing the interests of everyone involved, and developing a
solution that fairly addresses all, the Rehnquist Court, like the
Warren Court in Brown II, has given priority to the concerns of
Whites while continuing to sacrifice the interests of people of color.
This brings us then to the issue of the Court's unwillingness
to address the complexity of the problem of racism and to think
deeply and creatively about solutions. As I noted earlier, the
Court in Brown I alluded to an integration ideal: a society in
which access to opportunity is not impeded by legally sanctioned
segregation. Yet, in Brown II, the Court came forth with a very
limited solution, one that was insufficient to achieve this ideal.
The same holds true in the Court's treatment of affirmative action.
The Court embraces the ideal of a nation in which race no longer
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Court is willing to adopt only partial or limited means to this end.
One sees this in the Court's embrace of formal as opposed to
substantive equality principles. It appears the Court's solution to
the problem of racism is to invalidate laws, rules, and practices
that treat people differently because of race. Everyone-Whites as
well as people of color-must be treated the same. 9  This is
reflected in the Court's insistence that affirmative action measures
be subject to the same searching standard of review as measures
fueled by racial hatred. It is also reflected in the Court's all out
embrace of colorblindness. To the extent there are occasional
violators of the colorblind principle, the Court is willing to allow a
carefully crafted response if intent to discriminate can be proven
or if there is some other compelling justification for the differential
treatment (i.e., diversity).0
What the Court's analysis misses is that to the extent people
are situated differently due to discrimination, differential
treatment may be necessary to remedy existing inequality. The
Court also fails to recognize that discrimination today is
increasingly difficult to detect either because discriminatory actors
are more sophisticated (and will hide their motives) or because, as
Professor Charles Lawrence has noted, their bias may be
unconscious.8' Thus, the Court's requirement of a showing of
intent is misguided.
79. Justices Thomas and Scalia are perhaps the most vigorous advocates of this
view. Justice Scalia argues:
[G]overnment can never have a "compelling interest" in discriminating on
the basis of race in order to "make up" for past racial discrimination in the
opposite direction. Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial
discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution there
can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is
alien to the Constitution's focus upon the individual, and its rejection of
dispositions based on race, or based on blood. To pursue the concept of
racial entitlement--even for the most admirable and benign of purposes-
is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American.
Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (citations
omitted); see also id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) ("In my mind,
government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is
racial discrimination, plain and simple.").
80. Of course, the fact that educational institutions can consider race in seeking
diversity shows that we are not a colorblind society. The only reason race is
relevant to diversity is because people of color are differently situated (e.g., have
different experiences and are treated differently) because of their race!
81. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (stating that
"a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by
unconscious racial motivation").
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Instead of looking directly at the complex nature of
discrimination and trying to devise effective solutions, the Court
has elected to hide behind abstractions. What we have witnessed
is an inordinate amount of time spent on determining which level
of scrutiny or constitutional review (strict or intermediate) ought
to apply to affirmative action programs. To be sure, the majority
maintains that strict scrutiny is necessary to differentiate benign
from invidious discrimination-to smoke out evil-doers.82  But,
after 400 years of racism in the United States, do we not know it
when we see it? As Justice Stevens argued in Adarand, do we not
know the difference between a welcome mat and a "No
Trespassing" sign? Would not this nation be better off trying to
do something about the racism we see, rather than being
paralyzed by analyses that seem to take us nowhere?
Of course, the critical question is whether the Court still sees
racism in 2005. Perhaps it is in this area that the Rehnquist
Court differs from the Warren Court. In 1955, it was impossible to
hide from the visible, palpable, tangible manifestations of
American racism. The signs and evidence were everywhere.
Although we are only fifty years removed from that world, it seems
that today's Court thinks that racism no longer exists, or at least it
is not the problem that it once was." This conclusion is supported
by the fact that the Court, through its various rulings, has in effect
placed an almost impossible burden on plaintiffs to establish the
legitimacy of race-conscious measures.85 The allocation of this
burden is indeed odd given the long history of discrimination in
this country and continuing evidence of widespread racial
inequality. 6 On the other hand, its placement makes perfect sense
if one believes that racist actors are only an occasional problem
82. See supra note 63.
83. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Justice O'Connor's expectation that there will be no need for affirmative
action in twenty-five years also gives witness to the Court's limited understanding
of the resilience and pervasiveness of racism. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 343 (2003).
85. The burden arises from the Court's adoption of strict scrutiny for all racial
classifications, its demand for highly individualized findings of discrimination, its
rejection of societal discrimination as a basis for affirmative action, and its focus on
the effects of remedial measures on Whites. See, e.g., id. at 326-27 (holding that
racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) (requiring specifically identified incidents of
discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (noting
that remedying societal discrimination alone is insufficient to justify a racial
classification); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274 (1978)
(expressing concern because Whites could not receive one of sixteen reserved seats).
86. See supra note 55.
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and that contemporary inequality is the fault of those who fail to
lift themselves up by their bootstraps.
III. Looking to the Future
I have argued that in the context of civil rights, today's Court,
like the Warren Court in Brown II, has failed to engage seriously
the perniciousness and intractability of American racism. Instead,
it has reached for solutions that are acceptable to a majority of the
public. The question is, where do advocates for racial justice go
(literally) from here?
In 1993, Professor Gerry Spann expressed doubt about
whether the Supreme Court can serve as a guardian of minority
rights."7 As the analysis set forth in this Essay demonstrates, the
Court is a fundamentally conservative institution. It seems that
for every progressive step forward in the law, the Court takes the
civil rights community two steps back. The states ratified the
Reconstruction Amendments88 and Congress enacted the civil
rights statutes of 1866 and 1870.89 The Court gutted both the
Amendments and the statutes in the Slaughter-House Cases," the
Civil Rights Cases,91 and Plessy v. Ferguson.9" Although the Court
decided Brown I, it also decided Brown I. Congress passed the
Voting Rights Act, 93 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9' and
implemented various affirmative action measures. The Court has
systematically undermined them all.
Perhaps civil rights advocates might be better off directing
their efforts elsewhere, such as the national legislature. Indeed, in
some areas, Congress has expressly reversed the Court's narrow
interpretation of various civil rights statutes.95 The problem is
87. GIRARDEAu A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993).
88. See supra note 3.
89. See supra note 4.
90. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
91. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
92. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
95. For example, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.), Congress reversed a number of Supreme Court
cases that restricted the scope of certain anti-discrimination statutes. See, e.g., id.
at 1071 (arguably reversing the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of
disparate impact claims in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989));
id. at 1071-72 (expanding coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and reversing Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)); id. at 1074 (redefining mixed motive
claims and reversing, in part, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
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that if the Court concludes that Congress has exceeded the
authority granted it under the Constitution, the Court can
96invalidate a Congressional statute. Moreover, legislatures (like
courts) can be instruments of oppression.9 7 After all, it was an old
state legislative enactment that the Court invalidated in Lawrence
v. Texas.9" And, it was Congress that passed the Patriot Act.99
At the end of the day, perhaps no institution is infallible.
What ultimately may be needed is a strategy that employs legal
and policy arguments directed at all branches of the government.
Lest we lose sight of the nature of the problem and the goal being
pursued, this strategy must be historically grounded and engage
the realities of discrimination in a frank and forthright manner.
Also, it must avoid the victim/perpetrator dichotomy that has
alienated both the courts and the general public and gotten civil
rights advocates nowhere in recent years. In addition, while
keeping history front and center, civil rights advocates must
somehow engage a population that professes to being tired of
talking about race, racism, and things for which it bears no
responsibility because "it didn't do anything wrong." Perhaps one
way to accomplish the above aims is by showing how all
Americans are interconnected and how anti-discrimination efforts,
or a norm of equality, ultimately serve everyone's interests. In
1980, Professor Derrick Bell made a similar suggestion in setting
96. See, e.g., Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (limiting claims that can
be brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (limiting the scope of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
97. The general public has also demonstrated hostility to the rights of others.
For example, in 1996, California voters passed Proposition 209, which outlawed
affirmative action by state actors in California. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
(prohibiting preferential treatment for anyone based on race, sex, color, ethnicity,
or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting). For the text of Proposition 209, see
http://vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/html/BP/209text.htm. In 1992, Colorado voters
passed Amendment II, which prohibited the state from protecting persons who
were discriminated against because of their homosexuality. See Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding Amendment II unconstitutional). In the 2004
elections, voters in eleven states passed amendments barring gay marriage. See
Voters Pass All 11 Bans On Gay Marriage, MSNBC.com, Nov. 3, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353.
98. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute prohibiting certain
intimate relations between persons of the same sex).
99. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (allowing for increased surveillance throughout the country).
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forth the "principle of interest convergence." ' He notes:
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites. However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone,
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial
equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the
superior societal status of middle and upper class whites.
It follows that the availability of fourteenth amendment
protection in racial cases may not actually be determined by
the character of harm suffered by blacks or the quantum of
liability proved against whites. Racial remedies may instead
be the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps
subconscious judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted,
will secure, advance, or at least not harm societal interests
deemed important by middle and upper class whites. Racial
justice-or its appearance-may, from time to time, be counted
among the interests deemed important by the courts and by
society's policymakers. '
The strength of this insight is apparent when one considers
key moments in the quest for racial equality in this country. For
example, it is widely known that on January 1, 1863, Abraham
Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, which abolished
slavery in parts of the South."' Yet, contrary to popular belief,
Lincoln was not motivated solely by a desire to end the moral evil
of slavery. ' 3 In a letter to Horace Greeley dated August 2, 1862,
Lincoln wrote:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and
is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the
Union without freeing any slave I would do it; and if I could
save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could
100. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
101. Id.; cf. Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class,
and Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253 (2005)
(examining the possibilities for coalition politics and mutual cooperation among
blacks and other groups).
102. Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). Importantly, the Proclamation
ended slavery only in those states in rebellion against the Union as of January 1,
1863. Id. Slavery continued in the loyal border states and in those southern states
under Union control.
103. See Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom,
1860-1870, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 2153, 2163 (1996) (summarizing divisions within
the Republican Party and noting "[tihe pressing matter for the Republican Party in
1860 was neither the emancipation of the slaves nor the establishment of civil and
political rights.. Rather, saving the Union and stopping the expansion of slavery
were its overwhelming concerns"). Lincoln supported the abolishment of slavery
albeit on a gradual basis and with some compensation for slave owners. FRANKLIN
& MOSS, supra note 5, at 205-09. For more on Lincoln's views, see Andrew E.
Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U.
L. REV. 1283, 1338-60 (2000).
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save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also
do that.' 
4
It was because emancipation served to weaken the rebelling
states' and because it reduced the chance of foreign intervention
by the anti-slavery French and British that Lincoln issued the
Proclamation. °6  In short, emancipation happened because it
served the interests of Blacks in escaping the bonds of slavery and
the interests of the Republican Party in preserving the Union and
securing international respect."7
A similar convergence of interests led President Truman to
sign Executive Order 9981 in 1948, which led to the eventual
desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces.!" To be sure, Truman
was influenced by domestic civil rights organizations that were
vigorously advocating for racial equality."09 But he also faced
international pressure to live up to the democratic ideals
104. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862), reprinted
in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 388 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)
(emphasis omitted).
105. See Taslitz, supra note 103, at 1356 (noting Lincoln's conclusion that
emancipation was "a 'necessary military measure' [and his hope that] it would
encourage slaves to flee, thus depriving the South of a source of its strength").
106. Id. (suggesting that the French and British would be inclined to intervene
on behalf of the South to the extent that the South could continue to characterize
the war as a fight for independence from Northern oppression rather than as a war
to maintain the institution of "human bondage")
107. As historians John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, Jr. note:
If the Emancipation Proclamation was essentially a war measure, it had
the desired effect of creating confusion in the South and depriving the
Confederacy of much of its valuable labor force. If it was a diplomatic
document, it succeeded in rallying to the Northern cause thousands of
English and European laborers who were anxious to see workers gain their
freedom throughout the world. If it was a humanitarian document, it gave
hope to millions of blacks that a better day lay ahead, and it renewed the
faith of thousands of crusaders who had fought long to win freedom in
America.
FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 5, at 208.
108. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1948). For an overview of efforts to
desegregate the military, see generally RICHARD M. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF
THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: FIGHTING ON TWO FRONTS 1939-1953 (1969).
109. See MORRIS J. MACGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES 1940-
1965, 3-8 (1985) (recounting the efforts of organizations like the NAACP); John L.
Newby, II, The Fight for the Right to Fight and the Forgotten Negro Protest
Movement: The History of Executive Order 9981 and Its Effect upon Brown v. Board
of Education and Beyond, 1 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 83, 102-05 (2004) (recounting the
efforts of A. Philip Randolph and the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military
Service and Training). For a chronology of key events leading to the desegregation
of the U.S. armed forces, see Raymond H. Geselbracht, The Truman
Administration and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces: A Chronology,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/desegl.htm (referencing the influence of civil rights
organizations on domestic policymakers).
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domestically that this country had been espousing abroad."' In
addition, Truman was influenced by the military's need for
manpower-a need that was particularly pressing in face of the
perceived threat from Communism and the onset of the Cold
War."'
Finally, a convergence of the interests of Blacks and those of
the rest of the country led to Brown I in 1954 and the Grutter and
Gratz decisions in 2003. As Professor Bell has noted, by the
middle of the twentieth century, African Americans had been
challenging school segregation for well over a century. To
understand the sudden shift in 1954 away from Plessy and
towards a commitment to desegregation, Bell argues that one
must acknowledge Brown's value to those Whites "in policymaking
positions [who were] able to see the economic and political
advances at home and abroad that would follow abandonment of
segregation.""' These individuals "realized that the South could
make the transition from a rural, plantation society to the sunbelt
with all its potential and profit only when it ended its struggle to
remain divided by state-sponsored segregation." 3 Bell notes that
Brown also "helped to provide immediate credibility to America's
struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of
emerging third world peoples" and "offered much needed
reassurance to American Blacks that the precepts of equality and
freedom so heralded during World War II might yet be given
meaning at home.""
Notwithstanding the limitations of the Michigan cases, it was
this kind of broad-based inclusive strategy that ultimately saved
the day for affirmative action in higher education. By arguing
that diversity benefits everyone, and not just students of color, the
University was able to assemble a powerful coalition in support of
its position-a coalition that included traditional civil rights
organizations, educational institutions, military generals, and
large corporations."' With so many varied interests invested in
110. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 61 (1988) (examining the interplay between democratic ideals, U.S. foreign
policy objectives, and desegregation efforts at home).
111. On the need for military efficiency and manpower, see Newby, supra note
109, at 106; MacGregor, supra note 109, at 3. On the influence of communism, see
generally Dudziak, supra note 110.
112. Bell, supra note 100, at 524.
113. Id. at 525.
114. Id. at 524.
115. These entities asserted that diversity served their respective interests in
various ways. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in
Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 and
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the outcome, the Court seemed more receptive to the diversity
argument"' and perhaps the larger population was as well.1 '
In conclusion, moving forward in the quest for racial equality
will require sustained activism directed at all branches of the
government and at the public at large. It will require no small
degree of courage and commitment from this nation's leaders and
policymakers-the sort of courage and commitment that resulted in
Brown I. Avoiding the mistakes of Brown H, however, requires
more than mere symbolism. As suggested by this Essay, it
demands dedication to engaging the difficulties inherent in
eradicating racial discrimination as well as openness to exploring
and delineating the ways in which racial equality serves not just
people of color, but everyone.
02-516) (arguing that a diverse workforce is important to their continued success in
the global marketplace); Brief of General Motors Corporation in Support of
Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241 and 02-516) (maintaining that
"racial and ethnic diversity in the senior leadership of the corporate world is crucial
to our Nation's economic prospects"); Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W.
Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306
(arguing that a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the
military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security").
116. Justice O'Connor, the author of the opinion setting forth the Court's holding
that diversity constitutes a compelling state interest, was influenced by the
arguments of this coalition. O'Connor's articulation of the advantages of a diverse
student body demonstrates her belief that diversity benefits not only people of
color, but all citizens in our society. She points to four "substantial" benefits of a
diverse student body. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-32 (explaining that a diverse
student body (1) promotes cross-racial understanding, (2) encourages good
citizenship, (3) prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,
and (4) creates and legitimates future leaders).
117. For analysis of the limitations of the diversity argument, see Trina Jones,
The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 171 (2005).
